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La question traitée ici est comment, et avec quelles implications, les gens peuvent 
d￩cider de ne rien vouloir savoir de secrets les concernant, et cela m￪me s’ils peuvent 
obtenir l’information sans effort ou sans frais. Le raisonnement est pr￩senté en termes 
de relations d’agence, les principaux, suppos￩s ne pas vouloir connaître l’information 
détenus par les agents, étant les électeurs et lesdits agents étant les politiciens au 
pouvoir. Après une exploration rapide des motivations pouvant expliquer l’attitude des 
principaux, l’expos￩ se concentre sur les cas où il n’y a ni secret total ni compl￨te 
transparence. La demande de maintien d’un secret partiel est analys￩e à l’aide de deux 
mod￨les, l’un concernant des processus en cours, l’autre des ￩v￩nements passés. Pour 
finir le papier discute la façon dont le mécanisme étudié interagit avec des mécanismes 
voisins 
 




The matter studied here is how, and with what implications, people may decide that 
they do not want to be let into secrets that concern them. They could get the information 
at no cost but they refuse to know. The reasoning is framed in terms of principals and 
agents,  with  the  principals  assumed  not  to  want  to  know  the  agents’  secrets.  For 
convenience, the context chosen for the exposition is mainly that of voters as principals 
and  the  government  or  the  office-holders  as  agents.  After  some  exploration  of  the 
motivations underlying the attitude of the principals, the paper focuses on the case when 
neither total secrecy nor total disclosure prevails. The demand for partial secrecy is 
analysed with the help of two models, one devoted to ongoing processes and the other 
to  past  events.  Finally  the  paper  discusses  some  of  the  ways  the  “don’t  tell  us 
mechanism” may interact with two others: “thinking about something else” and “low 
issue salience”. 
 




Classification JEL A13, D72, D82 
 
* I am grateful for written comments by Manfred Holler and suggestions by participants 
in  the  2009  Meeting  of  the  European  Public  Choice  Society.  The  usual  disclaimer 
applies. 
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1.  Introduction 
The matter studied here is how, and with what implications, people may decide that 
they do not want to be let into secrets that concern them. They could get the information 
at no cost but they don’t want to. They refuse to know. There are many instances of 
such behaviour in the real world but it runs counter to the way asymmetric information 
is usually addressed in economics.  
The word “secret” does not convey exactly the same meaning as do the words 
“hidden” or “private”. Yet, it is interesting to compare the logic of the phenomena we 
are concerned with in this paper to the usual treatment of hidden or private information 
in economics. There, hidden information is the source of a cost at least to one of the two 
parties to a relation. In some situations, principals have to pay a premium to mitigate the 
effects of the exploitation of their private information by the agents. In other cases, 
information asymmetry is the source of a cost to both agents and principals, for instance 
limiting some mutual gain of trade; if the information which only agents possess could 
credibly be revealed to principals, both sides would gain. By contrast, in the state of 
affairs we study in this paper secrets can be profitable to both parties. If principals did 
not find some advantage in being “kept in the dark”, so to say,  there would be no 
demand from them to being kept in the dark. If agents preferred to reveal information, 
its disclosure would be an easy way for them to satisfy that preference. Admittedly, 
things  can  be  otherwise  when  the  relationship  is  considered  in  a  wider  setting 
(hierarchical in particular). Agents might be forced by principals to keep information 
secret even though disclosure to principals would suit them better. But, in that case, the 
phenomenon  we  are  interested  in  becomes  even  more  different  from  the  logic  of 
information asymmetry as discussed in economics.  
We will not dwell on the motivations of agents who want to keep secret some 
facts which they know. We take as an established fact that agents generally have an 
incentive to do so and we focus on the less understood reasons why principals may also 
want agents to behave toward them in that way, and on various implications of that 
desire. In the more analytical part of the paper, we tend to suppose that principals are 
voters or citizens and the agents are governments, office-holders, rulers or incumbents. 
This is mainly for convenience since the scope of our reasoning is more general.  Many 
categories  of  principals  are  happy  to  ask  for  or  allow  some  degree  of  secretive 
behaviour on the part of their agents. To illustrate, the principals may be politicians,   4 
rulers  or  chief  executives  and  their  agents  may  be  bureaucrats  or  employees,  their 
mutual relationship embodied in hierarchical organizations. Or principals may be the 
members of political parties such as the Communist Parties of the West in the 1950s and 
the agents the Communist leadership in general.  Principals may be shareholders and the 
agents the managers of large quoted companies. Principals may be buyers of furs, foie 
gras or tropical wood and the agents the suppliers of these products. Or the principal 
may be one country such as the United States or France, and the agent some Latin 
American or African dictatorship.  
Even with explicit reasoning focused on voters and politicians, there are several 
types  of  motivations  and  settings  which  may  justify  the  behaviour  of  voters  as 
principals. We discuss the most relevant ones in Section 2. The concept of secret or 
secrecy is not as straightforward as it seems. Although there are certainly many cases of 
complete secrecy in the area of politics, it is also true that many apparent cases of 
complete secrecy do not remain so under additional examination or reflection. Secrets 
that everybody knows -- “open secrets” -- constitute an extreme case. But openness, or 
secrecy, may be a more continuous variable. Even when total secrecy does not obtain, 
there may be a demand by principals for partial secrecy on the part of agents. We study 
explicitly this phenomenon in Section 3 with the help of two small models, one devoted 
to partial secrecy about ongoing processes and the other to partial secrecy about past 
events.  
Psychological mechanisms have become widely studied in economics, notably in 
the setting of experimental economics. The purpose of the present paper is limited; it is 
instrumental to reflections on particular political or political economy matters, and this 
may explain that the discussion will not be explicitly connected to the economics and 
psychology literature. In fact, the paper is an element in a line of thought started on the 
occasion of an essay on European integration (Salmon 1995). The subject was what is 
called  today  “integration  by  stealth”  (this  felicitous  expression  was  not  used  in  the 
essay) and one of the ideas defended was that voters wanted, and perhaps still want, 
integration  to  have  that  feature  (stealth).  Contrary  to  conventional  wisdom,  it  was 
claimed that voters do not (or did not) want to know where integration may lead to. 
Admittedly, in that first paper, the discussion of the mechanism underlying the attitude 
was  only  suggested.  Another  mechanism,  “thinking  about  something  else”,  was   5 
explored in Salmon (2001). It may work as an alternative or as a complement to “not 
wanting  to  know”,  depending  on  the  circumstances.  This  is  also  true  of  a  third 
mechanism, which we may call the awarding of “low issue salience”, discussed in the 
context of political extremism in Salmon (2002) and more generally in Salmon (2007). 
Lastly, in Salmon and Wolfelsperger (2007), the main puzzle addressed – as illustrated 
by the French policy against crime and by the Common Agricultural Policy--  is the 
phenomenon  of  “acquiescence  to  opacity”  (the  topic  of  the  1995  essay),  which,  of 
course, brings us quite close to the logic of “demand for secrecy” discussed here.  
A small part of Section 2 below follows the Salmon-Wolfelsperger paper. The rest 
of the analysis presented here -- in particular, the theoretical argument of Section 3 -- is 
completely  new.  Section  4  explores  some  relations  between  the  three  mechanisms 
mentioned above and Section 5 is a brief conclusion. 
 
2.  Motivations underlying “don’t tell me” attitudes 
Some distinctions may help to manage the diversity of cases. Let us start with contexts 
and distinguish three categories. A strictly bilateral context is when a secret is disclosed 
by one person to another and the existence of other individuals -- whether or not the 
secret is also disclosed to them -- does not count. Why, in such context, may B prefer 
not to know A’s secret? Several motivations may account for the attitude, even in so 
restricted a setting. One possibility is that knowing A’s secret could not but have an 
effect on B’s behaviour; then B may refuse to be told the secret because he or she does 
not want that to happen. That case is usually discussed as an instance of self-deception, 
which may or may not entail that the underlying behaviour is irrational (Mele 1997), 
but,  in  the light  of  recent  developments  in  the economics  of  psychology,  it  can  be 
interpreted in other ways. A more traditional explanation would involve fully standard 
strategic considerations, B’s anticipation being that both A’s and B’s behaviours would 
change in an interactive way if the secret were disclosed.
1 Strategic calculation may 
then induce B to refuse being told A’s secret. A different approach is related to the mind 
being treated “as a consuming organ”, as suggested by Schelling (1984) - that is, the 
mind being something subject,  on par with  the body, to  utility-providing or utility-
depriving flows. In the pure case, if B knows that knowing about A’s secret will not 
                                                 
1 See Levine and Ponssard (1977) for a related framework. I am grateful to Hakan Holm for the reference.   6 
affect behaviours or have any other kind of tangible effect whereas it might well be 
painful, then B may rationally choose to safeguard at no cost his or her peace of mind 
by not knowing.  
We may call bilateral-augmented the contexts in which B would be the only one 
to be told A’s secret (it would be told confidentially) but the existence of other persons 
or institutions does count. For instance B may have a commitment or an inclination to 
tell everything to C and that would undermine any pledge of confidentiality made to A. 
It can be better then for B to refuse being informed in the first place. Or knowing A’s 
secret could engage B’s responsibility vis-à-vis some outside person or authority. This 
consideration is particularly likely to be relevant if B has some reason to suspect that 
A’s secret might involve something illegal or unethical. 
For want of a better word, we may call the third context “multilateral”. The fact 
that we focus on it explains the title of the paper: “don’t tell us” instead or “don’t tell 
me”. If A’s secret were disclosed, it would be disclosed directly to several, possibly 
many, individuals. The question, then, is why any of these individuals might prefer 
disclosure not to happen. Several of the motivations just discussed – especially those 
related to treating one’s mind as a consuming organ - remain relevant but a new one is 
particularly important. Each individual may be influenced now by the fact that the secret 
is divulged also to others. Suppose that A’s secret is about a dimension K of P. For 
convenience we suppose P to be a policy, but it could be any kind of action or even 
person  (an  incumbent  for  instance),  or  some  collective  (a  party,  a  country,  etc:).  
Suppose that individual B strongly supports P when information about dimension K is 
kept secret. Suppose also that B always assigns some positive utility to being better 
informed about all the properties or dimensions of P (there is no motivation of the type 
“mind as a consuming organ”). However, the utility that B assigns to the fact that other 
individuals will be better informed about K may be negative. As a strong supporter of P, 
B may think that, if there were more information available about K, he or she would 
personally have a low probability of changing his or her mind whereas there would be a 
higher probability that at least some of the other supporters of P would change theirs. If 
that happened, policy P might lose support and even might be discarded contrary to 
what B would wish. Depending on a more precise calculation of costs and benefits   7 
(adumbrated in Salmon and Wolfelsperger, 2007), B may thus prefer information about 
K not to be disclosed.  
More  generally,  an  individual  --  a  voter  for  instance  --  may  think  that  the 
disclosure of some hidden facts to several persons, or to a whole electorate, could start 
or accelerate a collective dynamic process whose outcome is difficult to predict but 
might be quite unfavourable. This might happen in particular when distributive and 
fairness considerations dominate. Individuals approaching uncertainty in that way might 
then consider that it would be safer for them or for all if disclosure were eschewed -- 
and this even when the information disclosed is likely to be valuable in itself. The case 
for such attitudes is strengthened if the individuals are risk-averse.  
The foregoing discussion supposes that the  relevant  information  is  either held 
completely secret or completely disclosed. Before turning to situations in which that 
simple dichotomy does not obtain, let me note two things. First, a consideration that 
generally plays an important role in the decision to refuse being told a secret is the 
degree of trust one has in the holder of the secret, or in the way that holder reacts to 
various kinds of circumstances. An extreme case is complete alignment of preferences. 
Principal B knows that agent A has exactly the same preferences and will decide as if B 
had decided himself or herself. More generally, even in the absence of such alignment, 
B may trust A to act to maximise B’s preferences. Or, even more generally, B may 
know how A would decide in such and such circumstances and this is enough to trust 
A’s decisions. This interpersonal kind of trust, confidence or knowledge may be a very 
important positive factor in “don’t tell me” behaviours (Breton  and Wintrobe 1982, 
1986). 
The second remark is that several of the motivations that may lead principals to 
prefer agents not to reveal information may play a role simultaneously. In the context of 
voting and supporting, when the principals are a large number of citizens and agents are 
politicians  in  office,  or  when  the  principals  are  numerous  ordinary  members  of  a 
political party and the agents are the leaders of that party, some of these principals may 
be motivated only by a desire to keep their peace of mind, others mainly by the fear of 
being held co-responsible if informed of some reprehensible actions by the agents, and 
others still mainly by the prospect of an uncertain collective dynamics whose outcome 
they may not like. The motivations of many individual principals may also be mixed.    8 
Consequently, in the following analysis, we need not distinguish any more between 
these  various  motivations.  We  simply  assume  that,  for  some  of  the  reasons  just 
discussed, principals – i.e. voters -- bear a cost when informed. 
  
3.   Features of the demand for partially open secrets. 
3.1. The significance of partially open secrets 
When examined more closely, many secrets do not seem so secret after all. A frequent 
pattern is the apparent disclosure of some secret behaviour or state of affairs followed 
by  the  demonstration  that  information  about  that  behaviour  or  state  of  affairs  was 
already available before the purported divulgation and even that it had been so for a 
long time. In such circumstances, it is often claimed that the so-called revelation brings 
nothing new (we will see that this  assertion  is  mistaken). Many illustrations  of the 
phenomenon  come  to  mind.  Let  us  mention  two:  the  publication  in  1973  of 
Solzhenitsyn’s book, The Gulag Archipelago, and more recently, the book (following 
an  interview  in  Le  Monde)  in  which  General  Aussaresses  (2001)  gives  a  detailed 
account of the torture and executions he and his unit of the French Army inflicted on the 
Algerian  rebels  during  the  “battle  of  Algiers”  in  1956-57.  Both  publications  were 
generally alleged to bring major revelations, a claim which was immediately denied by 
commentators who downgraded to secrets de Polichinelle - open secrets - the matters 
supposedly divulged. Indeed, information about the Gulag system, including about its 
magnitude, had transpired to the West at least since Boris Souvarine’s book published 
in 1939 and had become quite substantial and widely available in the 1960s (see Judt 
2005,  2008).  Testimonies  of  systematic  recourse  to  torture  by  the  French  Army  in 
Algeria in 1955-57 were published almost contemporaneously to the facts (see Branche 
2001, Shatz 2002). Yet, the French President and the Prime Minister, as well as many 
other  people  in  politics  and  in  the  intellectual  world  reacted  to  Aussaresses’s 
“revelations” as if stunned by them, as many people were apparently stunned in France 
in 1971 by The Sorrow and the Pity, a documentary about Vichy, in Germany in 1978 
by the television series  The Holocaust, and recently in America and everywhere by 
pictures of prisoner abuse in the Abu Ghraib prison of Baghdad.
2  
                                                 
2 In a second book (2008), Aussaresses is more explicit than in the first about the intimate knowledge that 
the government in Paris, and in particular one of the ministers in charge -- François Mitterrand -- had of   9 
To understand these reactions, two phenomena must be taken into account. One is 
the desire not to know, which we have already discussed. The other is uncertainty about 
the truth of allegations. A typical response from some quarters to information about the 
Gulag or the use of torture by the French army in Algeria -- as by the British forces in 
East Africa and Northern Ireland, the General Security Service in Israel, or the Spanish 
Civil  Guards  in  Spain  (see  Parry  2006)  --  has  been  to  give  it  the  status  of  simple 
allegations,  the  truth  of  which  could  then  be  denied,  or  their  scope  reduced  (e.g., 
downgrading  the  phenomena  to  single  “aberrations”).  In  such  situations,  individual 
voters or citizens, or party members, are facing contradictory assertions about facts. 
This  explains  that  revelations  of  the  kind  mentioned  above  (Solzhenitsyn’s,  or 
Aussaresses’s), even when not really genuine revelations, have a direct effect – as well 
as an indirect effect (by discrediting denials) -- on individuals’ belief in the reality of the 
facts concerned. This makes them highly significant.  
For the purpose of this paper, what the foregoing discussion suggests is that it 
might be fruitful to combine the desire not to know with an interpretation of secrets as 
continuous variables. We undertake to do that explicitly now. Two situations should be 
distinguished, depending on whether what is kept completely or partially secret is an 
ongoing process or something that happened in the past. 
  
3.2. Secrets about ongoing processes  
We assume here that the principal is an individual voter or citizen j and the agent whose 
behaviour is secretive is the government. The production of Y by the government (for 
example, a particular kind of policy against terrorism) gives individual j a gross benefit 
Bj.   
(1)       Bj = Bj (Y) 
Assume that j is perfectly informed about Bj. But the process Y has an aspect or a side 
effect -- or requires recourse to a means – K (for instance torture, or killing innocent 
people),  which  is  potentially  distasteful  to  individuals  such  as  j.
3  To simplify, we 
assume proportionality: 
                                                                                                                                               
the details of what the army was doing in Algiers in 1956-57. But again, as widely noted, this has been 
more or less an open secret for a long time.  
3 Instead of a personal repulsion to torture the cause of the cost of K to individual j may be related to the 
fear that K , when known, might start the kind of perverse collective dynamics mentioned in the previous 
section..   10 
(2)       K = Y 
The relationship may be perfectly known to j; or it may be kept perfectly secret from j; 
or, in between, it may be a partially open secret in the sense that j has heard about it and 
gives it some (subjective) probability j of being true. In the latter case, 0 <j <1; if 
there is no secret, j =1; if the secret is perfect j = 0. As perceived by j, K entails a cost 
Cj which depends on the probability that j gives to K and on a parameter j which is 
related to the strength of j’s dislike for the class of phenomena K is an instance of 
(strength of abhorrence of torture, for instance). Thus: 
(3)       Cj = jjK 
Assuming that both Bj and Cj are measured in the same units, the net benefit or utility 
derived by j from Y is  
(4)       Uj = Bj – Cj  = Bj - j jY 
For given values of j jand , individual j derives maximum utility at a level of Y in 
which 
(5)        d Bj /dY = j j  
 
[Figure 1 about here] 
 
In Figure 1, curve OB represents relation (1), and the straight lines starting from 
the origin represent Cj for different levels of j (the slopes of the lines are proportional 
to j). From j’s perspective, there is an optimal level of Y for each of these lines. These 
optimal levels are y0, y1, y2 and y3, corresponding respectively to j = 1; j = ½; j = 
1/8, and j = 0 (the straight line then is the horizontal axis).  Given the assumptions, it is 
clear that j’s utility increases with the degree of secret about K. To a varying degree, 
this is also true of many other voters. Thus, in this case, secretive behaviour is one of 
the “goods and services” that politicians in power, eager to be supported and re-elected, 
supply to voters so as to please them. In this sense we may speak of voters’ demand for 
secrecy as we speak of voters’ demand for security, etc. The fact that this demand is 
implicit and perhaps unconscious does not make it different in kind from the demand of 
voters in other domains. 
The model is incomplete, however, because it does not explain why secrecy is not 
always total, which, as is clear from relation (5) and Figure 1, would maximize voters’   11 
utility. One could perhaps simply assume something like a tax-price constraining the 
amounts demanded. For a more convincing treatment, one would have to engage in a 
more demanding analysis of supply. Some of its main features are not really difficult to 
pick up. Although politicians may also give a positive utility to secrecy (indeed, this is 
the usual assumption), they may find it (when constructed as a continuous variable) 
increasingly  costly  to  provide.  This  may  be  the  result  of  technical  and  political 
constraints on the production or maintenance of a high degree of secrecy. For instance, 
preventing any occurrence of leaks may require arrangements that are costly in terms of 
money or in terms of what would be the consequences on other  political goals and 
concerns of politicians. A different possibility is that incumbents, having in mind what 
they  might  fare  in  the  future,  are  not  displeased  to  associate  voters  to  their  deeds 
through  partial  disclosure.  In  that  case,  only  partial  secrecy  would  be  optimal  for 
incumbents, independently of cost considerations.  
 
3.3. Secrets about past events 
A major difference between the setting to be discussed now and the foregoing is that, in 
this subsection, Y and K have been realised in the past and are to be treated as given. 
They took place at time t, or until time t, and now we are at time t+n.  Using indexes t 
and  t+n  becomes  necessary.  The  knowledge  of  Kt  is  or  would  be  painful  to  many 
individuals at time t+n. This may generate a demand for some degree of secrecy about 
Kt. If this is the case, politicians will have an incentive to satisfy that demand and 
provide  secrecy,  even  though  doing  that  may  also  respond  to  other  considerations. 
Again, we do not attempt to construct a complete model. The question we are interested 
in is how the degree of secrecy may evolve between t and t+n. For convenience, we 
assume that all voters are identical or that there is a representative voter of some kind 
(median voter for instance, or, under the assumption of probabilistic voting, a weighted 
average of all voters).
4 This allows us to rewrite equation (3) of the previous subsection 
as 
                                                 
4 This is a strong assumption. The desire to make politicians accountable for their deeds may lead some 
voters to demand transparency rather than secrecy. This is particularly likely to be the case when voters 
did not vote for the politicians in power at time t (in a sense, however, these voters were not the principals 
of the incumbents, which makes the situation different). If heterogeneity is acknowledged, recourse to 
assumptions  akin  to  those  made  in  the  theory  of  probabilistic  voting  may  nonetheless  justify  the 
derivation of an aggregate demand for a degree of secrecy.   12 
(3bis)      Ct = ttKt.  
One important factor of change in the demand for secrecy is simply the effect of 
the passing of time on the cost of knowing about Kt. As a rule, and ceteris paribus, the 
intensity of emotions generated by knowledge about a past event diminishes over time.  
To give an extreme example, the fate of people massacred one thousand years ago does 
not generate the same intensity of emotions today than that of people killed last week, 
last year or even twenty years ago. The nature of this general phenomenon is partly 
psychological but is also related to differences in what is at stake, differences which are 
in  turn  related  to  generational  replacement  –  i.e.,  whether  or  not  people  of  our 
generation or of the generations of our parents and grand-parents were involved in the 
event.  
If coefficient  measures the eroding intensity of displeasure due to the passage of 
time between t and t+n, we may write: 
(6)      Ct+n =  t+nt+nKt. 
To  facilitate  comparisons,  let  us  consider  the  values  that  would  lead  to  the  same 
outcome in t+n as in t -- that is, let set Ct+n = Ct . 
Then: 
   ttKt = t+nt+nKt 
Since, by definition,  <1, we have 
   t+nt+n> tt 
If , the parameter of dislike, remained constant, this means that, for an equal cost C, 
less secret would be needed – that is, more disclosure would be permissible -- in t+n 
than was the case in t. 
 
[Figure 2 about here] 
  
However,  as  we  will  see,  historically    --  that  is,  abhorrence  of  the  kind  of 
phenomena K is an instance of -- is far from being constant. If this is so, as showed in 
Figure 2 its variation may reinforce or weaken the effect of  on . In other words, it is 
not certain that the degree of secrecy demanded diminishes with the passing of time 
(supply being another matter). In Figure 2, in which the two curves correspond to the   13 
same cost at t and t+n (the separation in two curves being due to ),
5 the degree of 
secrecy demanded diminishes, and would even have come to zero if   had remained 
constant, but it could have increased if had increased even more than is represented.  
 
4.  The “don’t tell us” mechanism and its brethren  
Inn Section 1, we mentioned the existence of two mechanisms related to the one studied 
in this paper. In social sciences, it is usually difficult to specify the conditions under 
which a mechanism is triggered (see, e.g., Elster, 2007). In some contexts, “thinking 
about something else” and “giving low salience to an issue” are two mechanisms or 
states of affairs that might meet the same needs than those satisfied by refusing to be 
told  a  secret.  Or  they  may  work  as  complements.  Deciding  which  process  or 
combination of processes will take place may be out of reach, but we can try to identify 
features of the environment of the mechanisms -- for instance, attention devoted to an 
issue by the media, or stress put on one dimension by some moral or judicial authority -- 
that favour one mechanism, process or state of affairs over the others. 
The three mechanisms are logically very different in their defining features but the 
ways they may shape the attitude of voters vis-à-vis incumbent politicians are not that 
dissimilar or, in any case, are closely interrelated. Thinking about something else is first 
of all an individual decision but it is conditioned by the social context, and governments 
or incumbent politicians play a role in that context. Issue salience is discussed in the 
literature mostly as a collective variable, concerning the whole electorate or subsets 
thereof, its determinants being typically assumed to be exogenous (but, for instance, see 
Schofield  2009).  These  assumptions  are  often  qualified  by  some  recognition  that 
politicians do find ways to influence the salience of some issues, in either direction (see, 
for  instance,  Salmon  2007,  Salmon  and  Wolfelsperger  2007)..  Independently  of  the 
theoretical literature on voting, there is a long tradition of denouncing the provision by 
rulers of panem et circenses (“breads and games”) as a way to distract the ruled from 
the matters they should be mostly concerned with. This claim is particularly interesting 
for our purpose because, in general, the mainly moral denunciations of this distraction 
do not target the rulers only but extend to the ruled -- when it is not the latter who are 
                                                 
5 For convenience, we assume in Figure 2 that Kt – in any case a constant -- is equal to 1 so that it need 
not be mentioned together with  on the horizontal axis.   14 
shamed as the main culprits. The underlying assumption is that both the demand by the 
ruled and the supply by the rulers are responsible for the outcome, which is exactly our 
point.  
When it is supposed that issue salience can be manipulated at the collective level, 
the  distinction  between  the  “thinking  about  something  else”  and  the  “low  issue 
salience” mechanisms is as follows. Not thinking about an issue remains an individual 
decision but it is easier to achieve when that issue has a low salience, a matter which in 
turn can be arranged to some extent by the politicians in office. The demand for being 
helped not to think about some issues is thus a demand addressed to the government for 
lowering  as  far as  possible the salience of these issues,  which the said  government 
obtains as a rule by increasing the salience of others.
6 When issue salience is itself 
assumed to be, at least in part, an individual matter, the distinction between “thinking 
about something else” and “attributing low salience” more or less vanishes.    
In the two models presented in the previous section,  can be reinterpreted as an 
indicator of the salience of the category of issues raised by K, varying across individuals 
in a single period in the first model, over time for a single representative voter of some 
kind in the second. The way it is introduced assumes that it is exogenous. Let us uphold 
that assumption. For a constant cost of K, a higher level of  must be compensated by a 
lower level of , and thus a higher degree of secrecy. This is true as a consequence of 
the assumptions made both in the setting of subsection 3.2 and (abstracting from the 
effect of time) in that of subsection 3.3. Taking into consideration also the solution of 
“thinking about something else” increases our understanding of this result. The higher 
the salience of an issue, the more difficult it is to think about something else. Refusing 
to know appears then as a substitute to “thinking about something else”. When recourse 
to the latter becomes more difficult, recourse to the former may take its place. For a 
given value of j and j, if voter j, in the setting of subsection 3.2, had given more 
importance to K than he or she did (that is, if j had been higher), then the optimal level 
of Y and the level of utility would have been smaller. This result is rather obvious: if 
people pay more attention to the negative side-effect of an action useful to them, this 
reduces the utility they derive from the said action and induces them to want less of it.  
                                                 
6 In general, issue salience is defined in relative terms (see Enelow and Hinich 1984), which implies that a 
decrease in the salience of some issue is associated with an increase in the salience of another. Here, 
however, , which we interpret as an indicator of issue salience, is treated as if defined in absolute terms.    15 
But there is no reason to suppose that cost remains the same except if it is so high 
that  society  could  not  withstand  an  increase.  In  that  case  (in  which  thinking  about 
something  else  is  precluded),  it  is  understandable  that  an  increase  in  salience  is 
accompanied by an increased demand for secrecy. If people do not care very much 
about torture, an increase in the importance given to that issue may or may not lead to 
an increased demand for secrecy about the practice (cost being allowed to vary). People 
may still think about something else, only somewhat less easily. If people care very 
much about torture ( is very high), then they (unconsciously) demand or need more 
secrecy about it. In a society in which moral values are very much stressed, the demand 
for secrecy about their violation is much stronger than it is in a society relaxed about 
morality -- see Rabin (1994) for a related argument.  
How will the relation between the demand for secrecy and the level of salience 
vary over time? In the model of Subsection 3.2, the salience of K and the value of the 
main policy -- that is, for each individual, his or her j and B j (Y) -- are assumed to be 
independent. In reality, when B j (Y) is large for most individuals, it is likely that the 
salience of K, that is  j, will be low. A context of external war or of intense danger of 
terrorism will affect positively the value given to the fight against the enemy or the 
danger,  and  negatively  the  attention  given  to  human  rights.  We  may  expect  then  a 
demand on the part of voters for secrecy about the side effects of the fight against the 
enemy or terrorists to be relatively weak. Full disclosure might be too much for them to 
bear -- that is, perhaps,  should not be equal to 1 -- but a value a little below 1 (e.g., a 
lot of evidence about breaches of human rights available but denied by the government) 
may leave most voters fully contented. When the war is over or the danger past, Y is 
abandoned  and  does  not  count  any  more  (the  setting  becoming  that  of  the  second 
model). It is likely then that, on average,  will increase and attention to human rights 
recover. This makes, ceteris paribus, secrecy about past events more valuable to voters. 
However, as noted, a force playing in the opposite direction is the passing of time. 
Altogether, it is usually only after some decades that the demand for secrecy completely 
evaporates. Only then can society face at no psychological cost and without upheavals 
all the aspects of its past.  
In addition to the effects of war and peace and interacting with them, there may be 
in some matters a trend in the variation of issue salience and thus in the demand for   16 
secretive  behaviour.  In  the  past,  the  dominance  of  ideologies  such  as  nationalism, 
ethnocentrism and historicism has led to an almost complete neglect of -- if not an 
explicit contempt for -- humanitarian considerations in general. A few million dead here 
and there did not matter so much, many people unfortunately felt, provided this served 
the main collective goal. And, a fortiori, breaches of human rights did not disturb very 
much a large part of the population, who, if need be, could deal with them simply by 
thinking about something else. The rise or return of humanitarianism, especially in the 
1960s  and  1970s  made  such  treatment  much  more  difficult  to  sustain.  Breaches  of 
human rights became an ever more important issue. As a consequence, there has been a 
potential for the demand for secretive behaviour to increase, hampered however, over 
some periods or in some countries, by the contexts  of war and terrorism  discussed 
above. Whether the said trend will turn out to be a lasting one or only part of a long 
cycle is difficult to say. 
 
5.  Conclusion 
In  the  foregoing  discussion,  we  analysed  voters’  demand  of  secretive  behaviour  by 
governments  as  a  particular  case  of  secretive  behaviour  by  agents  demanded  by 
principals. Such demand by principals may seem strange. It runs counter to the usual 
way  in  which  information  asymmetry  and  the  principal-agent  relationship  are 
understood. We discussed the various motivations and settings which may underlie the 
paradox but in the end focussed on the political relationships. As agents, rulers need 
some support or acquiescence from their principals -- the ruled. This is true even in the 
case  of  monarchs  and  dictators.  But,  in  democracies,  incumbents  competing  with 
challengers to remain in office are particularly attentive to getting the support of voters. 
For the purpose of increasing the probability that voters will vote for them at the next 
election, politicians in office attempt to deliver goods and services that satisfy voters’ 
generally implicit demand. We argued that, for some of the reasons discussed earlier, 
disclosure  may  generate  a  cost  to  voters  and  thus  that  secrets  may  constitute  one 
category of items whose provision they demand (which does not imply that secrets may 
not also have some utility for politicians).  
We focussed the theoretical discussion on cases when neither total secrecy nor 
total disclosure prevails. For instance, some information has been disclosed, is readily   17 
available, but it has also been denied. Thus voters are not perfectly sure one way or 
another. They attribute a probability to the information being true. Total secrecy is when 
that subjective probability is equal to zero, total disclosure when it is equal to 1. Under 
these assumptions, the demand for secrecy becomes a demand for partial secrecy -- that 
is,  for  arrangements  allowing  voters  to  give  a  low  probability  to  the  existence  of 
something which, inasmuch as it is known, entails for them some cost. We focussed on 
the  particular  case  of  this  something  being  an  unsavoury  aspect  of  a  policy  which 
otherwise  voters  like.  To  explore  that  setting,  two  models  were  distinguished,  one 
devoted to  ongoing processes  and the other to  past  events.  Finally  we made  a  few 
remarks  on  the  way  the  demand  for  partial  secrecy  may  interact  with  mechanisms 
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Figure 2:  The demand for secrecy about a past event 